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ABSTRACT
This essay explores virtue ethical concepts in the context of animal 
law theory and practice. For reasons discussed in the essay, virtue 
ethics may not, on its own, serve as an adequate foundation for gen-
eral anticruelty statutes, but it may have application in those contexts 
in which sufficient sharing of values enables participants in legal re-
form to work through differences in moral commitments to generate 
at least temporarily acceptable laws. The article considers a detailed 
example of that type of application, based on the actual and realistic 
situation of legislator-requested feral cat colony caretakers’ participa-
tion in the development of ordinances that regulate the management 
of such colonies. 
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Scholarship at the intersection of animal law and moral 
philosophy is varied, interesting in its own right, and impor-
tant when contemplating productive approaches to law re-
form. Gary L. Francione has developed a coherent, compelling 
animal rights theory based on analysis of the legal status of 
other-than-human animals, current treatment of those animals, 
and careful consideration of Kantian moral philosophy (Fran-
cione 1995, 2008). David Favre has written several articles to 
propose animal law reform founded on a utilitarian approach 
(Favre 2000, 2005, 2010). In comparison to deontological and 
utilitarian theories, the application of virtue ethics to animal 
law is still new. And, while the most satisfying theory and basis 
for reform may ultimately combine deontological and virtue 
ethical theory, it is worth exploring some aspects of virtue eth-
ics in the animal law context.
There are many philosophers focused on virtue ethics, but, 
for purposes of this essay, I rely heavily on the work of Rosa-
lind Hursthouse. In her book On Virtue Ethics, Hursthouse be-
gins with a simple contrast between utilitarian, deontological, 
and virtue ethical approaches:
Imagine a case in which it is obvious that I should, say, 
help someone in need. A utilitarian will emphasize the 
fact that the consequences of doing so will maximize 
well-being, a deontologist will emphasize the fact that, 
in doing so, I will be acting in accordance with a mor-
al rule such as “do unto others as you would be done 
by,” and a virtue ethicist will emphasize the fact that 
helping the person would be charitable or benevolent 
(Hursthouse 1999, 1).
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Hursthouse contends that, although normative ethics has been 
dominated recently by deontological and utilitarian theories, 
virtue ethics can be an equally useful source of normative guid-
ance on its own as well as in combination with deontological 
and utilitarian theories. 
Hursthouse notes that the starting point for deontological or 
utilitarian analysis has been to determine the moral status of the 
being/entity about which there is a question of appropriate con-
duct. She questions whether such a starting point is useful or 
necessary for all normative theories, including virtue ethics. In 
her essay, “Virtue Theory and Abortion,” Hursthouse explores 
whether it is necessary from a virtue ethical perspective to de-
termine the moral status of a fetus before deciding what moral 
conduct is in regards to a fetus (Hursthouse 1997, 217-38). 
Similarly, in her article “Applying Virtue Ethics to Our Treat-
ment of the Other Animals,” Hursthouse begins with the ques-
tion of whether it is necessary to determine the moral status of 
other-than-human animals before deciding what moral conduct 
is in regards to those animals (Hursthouse 2006, 136-54). She 
decides in both cases that behavior should be guided first and 
foremost by attention and reference to virtues and vices; how 
one behaves should be grounded in the kind of person one as-
pires to be and driven less at the outset by determinations of 
the moral status of the being/entity affected by one’s behavior. 
The type of being/entity affected by one’s conduct or to 
whom one’s conduct is directed soon becomes important, of 
course. What it means to be a virtuous person in relation to a 
rock is different from what it would mean to be a virtuous per-
son in relation to a living being, for instance. But there is less 
difference in actual behavior (guided by virtue) than one might 
suppose. A virtuous person would be unlikely to  kick a rock 
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just because he or she can kick the rock because a virtuous per-
son will be thoughtful at all times, in accordance with virtues 
that align with taking the least disruptive or potentially harmful 
action. Kicking a rock or throwing a computer out of a window 
in frustration would not be the act of a virtuous person because 
meaningless displacement of the rock or impulsive acting out 
of frustration does not match up well with several virtues such 
as patience and temperance in one’s actions. Therefore, even 
if one imagines other-than-human animals to be no different 
than rocks, those animals should not be subjected to the type 
of suffering currently inflicted on them. That those animals are 
not rocks, that they are sentient, means that additional virtues, 
such as kindness, apply to situations involving them, but the 
focus is still on acting in accordance with virtues. One’s first or-
der priority is the application of virtues to one’s actions, rather 
than basing one’s actions on an assessment of whether an other-
than-human animal is more like a rock or more like a human 
animal. Ideally one would ask, “What would a [kind, coura-
geous, honest, temperate] person do?” and not “What does the 
moral status of this entity require of me?” In this way, virtue 
ethics takes care of a serious problem Hursthouse identifies 
with respect to moral status inquiries leaving unexamined the 
question of how one is supposed to behave in relation to those 
entities that are not considered to be inside the moral commu-
nity (Hursthouse 1997).
Hursthouse does not use the example of law as it pertains to 
other-than-human animals. But the approach she questions—
determining the status of such animals first, with moral obliga-
tion following from that status—is one of the most salient and 
problematic features of animal law. Other-than-human animals 
are legally the property of human animals, and what is appro-
priate conduct towards an other-than-human animal is almost 
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entirely determined by that status (Francione 1995, 38-48). I 
say “almost entirely” because all states in the United States 
have enacted anticruelty statutes, which ostensibly prohibit hu-
man animals from inflicting severe suffering on an animal who 
is not a human (Wagman, Waisman, and Frasch 2009, 90-137). 
Other-than-human animals are not the property of human ani-
mals in the same way that, say, a table is property; inanimate 
objects such as tables are not covered by anticruelty statutes. 
Nevertheless, the rule that severe suffering and death can be 
inflicted if doing so is considered necessary effectively eviscer-
ates the prohibition on inflicting suffering. In fact, it is most 
accurate to say that anticruelty statutes do nothing more than 
prohibit completely gratuitously inflicted severe suffering; they 
do not inhibit in the least, let alone prohibit, severe suffering 
inflicted on other-than-human animals as a matter of standard 
business practices in institutional or industrial settings (Ibra-
him 2006; Francione 1995, 134-60). All institutionalized forms 
of inflicted suffering, as, for example, in factory farms, ani-
mal research facilities, and pest control activities, are accepted 
as “necessary.” Indeed, many of these activities are explicitly 
exempted, thereby eliminating any doubt about how a judicial 
evaluation of “necessity” would turn out. Thus, when it comes 
to factory farming, animal research facilities, pest control, and 
many other contexts in which other-than-human animals are 
harmed and killed, such animals are the legal equivalent of in-
animate objects such as tables: any type or amount of harm can 
be inflicted, and the human animals who inflict that harm are 
legally free of the label “cruel” (Francione 1995, 134-60).
One could debate whether anticruelty statutes are most use-
fully understood as situated within a deontological framework, 
being categorical rules with many exceptions, or situated in a 
utilitarian framework, requiring at the outset the balancing of 
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human animals’ and other-than-human animals’ interests to de-
termine how the legal rule should be structured and apply. And, 
of course, one could also debate whether it is the role of law 
to embed or encourage individual moral conduct as opposed 
to the regulation of resources and maintenance of an orderly 
society.1 However, my primary goal in this essay is to consider 
how virtue ethical concepts, many as developed by Rosalind 
Hursthouse, could enrich the discourse about animal law re-
form. I conclude that virtue ethical principles can be useful 
when dealing with a narrow class of animal law reform situa-
tions in which various potential legal alternatives exist, the al-
ternatives are based on different moral conceptions of the best 
practice to be supported or required by the legal rule, and those 
involved in the reform effort share sufficient values relevant to 
the task at hand and respect for one another to work together to 
propose or refine legal rules, policies, or guidelines for particu-
lar situations despite holding differing moral judgments about 
the specifics of those rules, policies, or guidelines. 
Features of a Virtue Ethical Approach
One of the goals of Hursthouse’s book On Virtue Ethics is 
to examine how virtue ethics provides a (not unproblematic) 
guide to action, as do deontological and utilitarian systems (in 
not unproblematic ways). A person could decide not to pull 
a cat’s tail because he has been told not to and is following 
that rule (derived from deontological or utilitarian reasoning) 
or because, as a person who values kindness, he wants to be 
kind in all endeavors including his interactions with the cat. 
With enough practice with the virtues, the virtuous person will 
eventually not even consider pulling the cat’s tail, whereas the 
person who simply follows rules may still be tempted and find 
1 Some would say that even without intentionality, laws shape conceptions of 
the “good person” (Stout 2011).
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reasons why pulling the cat’s tail on a particular occasion can 
be made to fit with an exception to the rule. Under many, if 
not most, circumstances involving other-than-human animals, 
mere rule-compliance becomes a proxy for gauging whether an 
individual is moral. Thus, an animal-based research scientist 
working within an exemption in an anticruelty statute escapes 
the label of “cruel,” no matter how unnecessary the research 
and how much suffering other-than-human animal subjects en-
dure because of it. If she measures her morality by reference to 
legal compliance, she can engage in research that would shock 
the moral sensibilities of observers without ever once doubting 
the sufficiency of her moral judgment. Some may argue that 
such indicates the inherent lack of sound moral judgment in the 
law itself. But, even if one grants that is so, and even if laws, in-
cluding their exceptions, are based on sound moral judgments, 
mere legal compliance is at best a substitution of others’ moral 
judgments for one’s own responsibility to ensure that one’s be-
havior is morally sound.
Virtue ethical conduct trains an individual in ever more vir-
tuous behavior as he practices making decisions about what to 
do based on virtues he seeks to entrain and vices he seeks to 
avoid. By comparison, rule-following behavior may train the 
individual primarily or only in rule-compliance, which could 
include the (not particularly virtuous) ready adoption of excep-
tions to the rule so as to satisfy desires that cannot be resolved 
without apparent violation of the rule. This is not to say that the 
virtuous person never pulls a cat’s tail. A kind person would 
pull a cat’s tail if it were the surest and safest way of rapidly 
removing the cat from greater harm than the risk of harm to the 
cat from pulling his tail. But the virtuous, kind person would 
be exercising the virtue of kindness, rather than operational-
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izing an exception to a rule of “no cat tail pulling.” Kindness 
required the particular act—in this case, pulling the cat’s tail.
This is also not to say that incorporation of virtue is exclu-
sive to virtue ethical reasoning. For example, it could be that 
the basis for a deontological rule to not pull the cat’s tail is 
also based on a principle of kindness. In that case, the virtue 
ethical rule not to pull the cat’s tail may differ from the deon-
tological rule only in that the motivation of kindness is more 
salient in the former than in the latter. However, there could be 
other reasons for a “no cat tail pulling” rule that is situated in 
a deontological framework. It is not always the case that there 
is one possible basis for a deontological rule or that the basis 
is clearly known. In such a case, one may be following a rule 
simply because one has been taught to follow the rule and not 
because one understands the basis for the rule. One is not be-
ing kind or becoming more kind if one does not know that the 
reason for the rule against cat tail pulling is kindness, because 
there could be other reasons for the rule. Once rules are codi-
fied through legal process, their relationship to whatever moral 
rule once grounded them can become sufficiently attenuated 
that use of exceptions and the pursuit of loopholes become the 
predominant guide to action. 
Being “virtuous” could come to include the behavior of “rule-
compliance.” However, rule-compliance is a behavior and not 
a virtue, such as kindness, fairness, compassion, integrity, and 
courage. Moreover, simply behaving in a rule-compliant way 
does not necessarily lead to ever more virtuous conduct. In or-
der for the conduct to be virtuous and promote the development 
of a virtuous character, one would need to know the basis in 
virtue for each rule, virtuous reasons for exceptions, and when 
to follow the rule or an exception in a virtuous way. One would 
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have to desire and intend first and foremost to be and become 
ever more virtuous. This commitment to deontological rules for 
reasons of virtue would be an example of a hybrid virtue ethics-
deontological type of reasoning. One’s basic commitment to 
and actual acting in accordance with virtues and avoiding vices 
provides an ever-increasing ability to behave virtuously in rela-
tion to all situations, whether there are rules derived from other 
normative theories associated with those situations or not. 
A person who, when confronted with a decision she identi-
fies as a moral question, wonders “what kind of person do I 
want to be?” rather than “what rule am I to follow?” should 
be able to develop a moral compass that can stand her in good 
stead as she encounters decisions of different degrees of com-
plexity and novelty. This is because she is constantly guiding 
her behavior by reference to virtues and avoiding vices, learn-
ing as she goes along how to behave more virtuously, and en-
joying such evidence as she obtains that she is becoming more 
virtuous. She thereby trains her emotions as well as her behav-
ior such that she can make increasingly better moral decisions. 
It seems an ideal way to build a virtuous character. It also seems 
to be a good perspective with which to engage in legal reform 
with others who understand that the legal issues at stake con-
tain morally charged aspects. 
Unfortunately, it is not easy or simple to build a virtuous 
character or to engage in legal reform when reformers disagree 
about what a good moral outcome would be. A significant chal-
lenge for a virtue-oriented individual is that different virtues 
may at times seem to require different actions, such as the occa-
sional conflict between kindness and honesty to a friend. Those 
conflicts cannot always be readily prioritized in order to provide 
a clear course of action either on the individual level or when 
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it comes to legal reform. Similarly, at times the expression of a 
single virtue may arise in connected contexts such that there is 
conflict or uncertainty about the most virtuous action one could 
take, such as a situation in which an expression of kindness 
to one person would result in an outcome that is not necessar-
ily kind to another. How should one resolve such dilemmas? 
Should one resolve such a dilemma based on such characteris-
tics as the closeness of one’s relationship or assessments of the 
apparent virtue of each of those who would be differentially af-
fected by one’s actions? Should the dilemma be resolved based 
on some other aspects of the situation? How can laws be based 
on virtues when there are such priority problems? As I discuss 
later, this type of problem constrains applicability of virtue eth-
ics in law, but it does not prevent all such application.
Priority and application problems are not unique to virtue 
ethical considerations, of course. They arise in deontologi-
cal and utilitarian rule development and application contexts 
as well. Moreover, such dilemmas are exacerbated when they 
arise as to conduct involving other-than-human animals, if such 
animals are given any moral consideration in human animals’ 
ethical decision-making at all. 
As an example of priority and application challenges in the 
virtue ethical context, imagine an egg producer who knows that 
the suffering of egg-laying chickens is extremely severe (Vegan 
Peace Home 2012; Davis 1996, 51-82; Singer 1990, 107-119). 
He knows firsthand that, because the species of chickens used 
for egg production is not the same as those used for meat pro-
duction, males of the species are economically useless. Imagine 
trays of recently hatched chicks on a conveyor belt taking those 
chicks past various workers. The males, who are totally use-
less for egg production, are tossed into grinders or thrown into 
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plastic bags or dumpsters where they suffocate from the weight 
of those thrown in after them. Females continue down the con-
veyor belt where their beaks are seared or cut and their toes are 
cut (with no analgesic or anesthetic), ending up in small wire 
cages they rapidly outgrow. The cages have wire floors that 
slant so that eggs will roll forward for ease of human collection, 
meaning that a hen can never stand on a level surface. She has 
no privacy, which hens seek out under normal circumstances. 
There is no opportunity to dust bathe, and no opportunity to 
spread her wings, let alone spread her wings in the sun. As am-
bient ammonia levels rise from all the hens’ waste that drops 
through the wire caging, severe eye irritation and blindness are 
common. Since it is difficult for workers to remove dead hens 
from crowded cages, a living hen may well have to share the 
cramped cage with dying and dead hens. When egg production 
drops off she may be starved along with the others so that those 
who survive the “forced molt” will have a few more cycles 
of increased egg production. When she is no longer useful for 
egg production, she can be killed, along with the others, in any 
number of terrible but inexpensive ways.2  
Suppose that the egg producer knows that chickens can ex-
perience pain and apprehension, including the male chicks, and 
that kindness would dictate foregoing many, if not all of these 
acts. Indeed, he has considered the possibility that he ought not 
be in the egg production business at all, due to the suffering he 
knows he is inflicting on thousands of chickens. Yet, he might 
also genuinely believe that it is the only way he could make a 
living for his family and that earning money for his family is 
kind, even if it means harming chickens. Thus, the egg pro-
ducer could consider himself to be a kind person even though 
some of his acts are not kind. 
2 Poultry are not covered by the federal Humane Methods of Slaughter Act 
(U.S. Code, Title 7, §§1901-1907). 
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This example left to the side those people who do not know 
that chickens suffer. To them, it is not obvious that the virtue of 
kindness even enters the picture; to them, it would be compara-
ble to being kind to a rock. However, scientists have confirmed 
that chickens experience pain (Nicol 2012), and, even if that 
had not been definitively confirmed, a kind person, watching 
a male chick trying desperately not to slip into a grinder, or 
slowly suffocating under the mass of other chicks thrown on 
top of him, or dehydrating and burning in the sun at the top of 
a dumpster, would err on the side of compassion and not par-
ticipate in the cruelty that appears to be unfolding (Bravebirds 
2012). In other words, a kind person who doesn’t already know 
about the suffering inherent in egg production would take steps 
to learn whether an act in which he is engaged is unkind and 
seek the path of kindness. Indeed, the pursuit of practical wis-
dom in exercising virtues (such as kindness, compassion) and 
avoiding vices (such as cruelty, insensitivity) is an overarching 
virtue in Hursthouse’s virtue ethical framework3 (Hursthouse 
1999, 13, 59-62). Learning new information that informs that 
process is itself virtuous and necessary for the exercise of other 
virtues and avoidance of vices. 
Pursuit of factual information alone will not solve the prob-
lem of priorities of virtues. In On Virtue Ethics, Hursthouse 
considers conflicting virtues and prioritizing virtues when she 
writes about dilemmas that may fall into three different catego-
ries: resolvable, irresolvable, and tragic. Understanding these 
categories is useful for the development of strategies for ad-
dressing priority and other application problems in virtue ethics 
and in the application of virtue ethics to law. Those problems 
3 Wisdom is an overarching virtue because it is a virtue about which it cannot 
be said that a person has the virtue “to a fault.” One can never be too wise, 
as one can be too honest or too frugal, for example. (Hursthouse 1999, 13, 
59-62)
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are severe as to human animals’ interactions with other-than-
human animals because of ingrained dismissive and disrespect-
ful societal attitudes toward other-than-human animals and the 
existence of laws that further those attitudes. 
Resolvable dilemmas are dilemmas which can be resolved 
if the virtuous person has the wisdom to apply virtues appro-
priately. Equally virtuous people would ultimately arrive at the 
same resolution of a resolvable dilemma (Hursthouse 1999, 42-
62). This is a type of dilemma that may be addressable through 
wise pursuit and integration of information into one’s thinking 
about problematic situations. It is not kind to treat chickens as 
the egg producer treats them, and a virtuous person would pur-
sue information and courses of action that would result in his 
not treating chickens that way. Once we reach a point at which 
it is clear that treating chickens as they are treated in Ameri-
can agriculture is unkind to chickens, unnecessary for human 
health, harmful in degrading water, air, and soil quality, and 
leads to inefficient utilization of plant resources in ways that 
aggravate prevalence of hunger, we have reached the resolu-
tion of the dilemma. It would seem at that point that the rule 
prohibiting such treatment should, as a moral matter, be codi-
fied. That such codification has not happened is arguably due 
primarily to political realities and consumer unwillingness to 
change pleasure-seeking practices, rather than genuine uncer-
tainty about moral grounding for such a rule (Ibrahim 2006; 
Francione 2010). It is a sobering example of the limits of codi-
fication even if a moral dilemma is resolved.
By contrast, an irresolvable dilemma is one in which there 
isn’t just one course of virtuous action that is preferable to an-
other (Hursthouse 1999, 63-71). Stated differently, if two equal-
ly virtuous people were confronted with the same dilemma, one 
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might choose one virtuous course of action, and the other might 
choose another equally virtuous course of action. An example 
might be the production of an amicus brief to support whales 
in a legal case filed by Japanese whalers to stop Sea Shepherd 
from thwarting their hunts. Suppose a virtuous philosopher 
wishes the court to know about the scientific and philosophical 
basis for appreciating the magnificence of whales and the desir-
ability of protecting them from all human-inflicted harms. She 
is advised by a virtuous and experienced attorney that the judge 
responsible for the case will accept such a brief only if it is 
framed in terms of the public’s (humans’) interest in protecting 
whales and not directly for the sake of the whales themselves. 
This requirement conflicts with the philosopher’s point of view 
that whales should be protected regardless of humans’ interest 
in them. It is also the point of view she thinks that the whales 
would wish to be taken on their behalf. Her choice is whether to 
behave virtuously in the sense of being forthright with the court 
about what, based on the evidence about whales, she genuinely 
believes (and how she believes whales’ would wish to be pre-
sented), or to behave virtuously in the sense of increasing the 
likelihood that evidence about whales will be heard at all by the 
court, albeit in a less whale-respecting way. Both express the 
virtues of kindness and compassion. 
Hursthouse cautions that, to the actor herself, there may ap-
pear to be only one virtuous way to proceed, and for that per-
son that particular dilemma appears to be a resolvable one. If, 
however, the actor herself recognizes that virtue could be un-
derstood to allow different responses to the same set of facts, 
she will find herself confronting an irresolvable dilemma. Of 
course, there can be much disagreement about whether two or 
more courses of action are in fact equally virtuous and about 
whether a truly virtuous person could not find a way to engage 
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all applicable virtues equally in her action. But, the point here 
is that there will be such situations in which equally virtuous 
but different reactions to the same set of facts will be possible 
and the virtuous actor will, herself, be aware of the dilemma. In 
those cases, there is no single virtuous response to the dilemma, 
leading some to criticize virtue ethics as failing to provide ac-
tion guidance. This presumes that action guidance must result 
in one and only one virtuous course of action. Letting go of 
that presumption sufficiently to give virtue ethics a fair trial is, 
perhaps, one of the greatest challenges a newcomer faces. It 
is particularly difficult in a legal context, if one’s objective is 
to find one and only one legal rule that can be derived from a 
virtuous process of reasoning.
Finally, there are tragic dilemmas (Hursthouse 1999, 71-85). 
In these situations the virtuous agent’s life will be marred by 
whatever virtuous action she might take. Philosophers often 
present railroad track (“trolley problem”) scenarios in which 
either one person or several people will be killed depending 
on the action or inaction taken by a person positioned so as to 
affect whether the one or the several will be killed. In the end, 
the person who acts or who fails to act will have the blood of 
at least one person on her hands; no matter how virtuous the 
reasoning process and the resultant act, her life will be forever 
marred by the commission or the allowance of a death to occur. 
A similar example is the tragic dilemma faced by feral cat 
colony caretakers who discover an aggressive cat in the midst 
of the colony. The cat attacks other cats to the point that they 
may develop life-threatening abscesses, but there is no possi-
bility of relocating the aggressive cat or the victim cats. Killing 
an aggressive cat will undoubtedly save some unknown num-
ber of victim cats from deaths from abscesses or being chased 
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into the path of cars. But killing the one to preserve the lives 
of the others obviously involves taking a unique and individual 
animal’s life. Either way, the colony manager will have blood 
on her hands.
Whether the example of the aggressive feral cat is seen as a 
“tragic dilemma” might appear to turn on how one thinks about 
the value of cats and the killing of cats. If a person cares little 
about the lives of the cats or the violence attendant to killing 
them (or other other-than-human animals), that person might 
understand the dilemma as salient but not tragic by Hurst-
house’s terms. That may be because the actor either does not 
value cats or, perhaps, does not think that veterinary-assisted 
killing is violent and disrespectful to the cats and, therefore, 
doesn’t believe her life would be marred by either course of ac-
tion that would involve killing the one or the many. However, 
the facts that other-than-human animals experience suffering 
and value their lives means that killing the one or the many in 
a situation similar to a trolley problem raises the same tragic 
dilemma as in a trolley problem involving potential human vic-
tims.
We will return later to the feral cat situation and apply it in 
a legal context, but, at this point, it is important that all catego-
ries of dilemmas defined in Hursthouse’s terms—resolvable, 
irresolvable, and tragic—have a subjective, agent-centered 
quality to the extent that the agent must take responsibility for 
becoming ever more virtuous. To Hursthouse, it is the man-
ner in which the actor reasons through the options by refer-
ence to furthering virtues and avoiding vices that enables us to 
characterize an actor as a person of virtue or not. It is not by 
absolute reference to the act itself and its consequences. For 
example, she is careful to note that vegetarianism is not itself a 
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virtue, even though vegetarianism, practiced for whatever rea-
son, results in less suffering experienced by other-than-human 
animals (Hursthouse 2006, 141-43). If one is a vegetarian ex-
clusively for reasons of one’s own health or for reasons of dis-
liking neighboring cattle ranchers, the individual’s vegetarian-
ism does not necessarily indicate that the person is kind, and 
her vegetarianism is not the exercise of the virtue of kindness 
(although it may be the exercise of another virtue or virtues). 
She makes no headway with entraining the virtue of kindness, 
even if others might attribute kindness to her on the basis of her 
vegetarianism.
Keeping all of the foregoing in mind, we can return to the 
egg producer who knows that his actions cause chickens to suf-
fer terribly but who nevertheless engages in those actions for 
reasons of supporting his family. Would the egg producer con-
sider the dilemma to be “resolvable,” “irresolvable,” or even 
“tragic?” Would it matter? And, if he does perceive the situa-
tion as a dilemma, as a virtuous person would he not acquire 
the wisdom necessary to find a different way of supporting his 
family? Stated differently, is the egg producer a “kind” person 
because he understands his acts to be kind to his family; must 
he consider the chickens at all? Since chickens suffer and show 
many signs of valuing their lives, it is simply not possible to 
consider one kind if one does not take into account those char-
acteristics of chickens when deciding how to act in relation to 
chickens. And that is as true of consumers as of producers of 
eggs and chickens.
Hursthouse does address the problem of a virtuous person 
who, having premised a decision on a particular virtue, realizes 
that another or the same virtue has been negatively impacted 
(Hursthouse 1999, 44-48). She writes of this “remainder” as a 
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cause for remorse, which, if recognized as such, provides some 
support for the virtue that is under-represented in the ultimate 
decision. However, stopping at that point—the experience of 
remorse about the road not taken—is not virtuous if the actor 
does not also continue in the quest for a way of eliminating the 
conflict that results in harm to some being or entity. The egg 
producer who is just sad about inflicting suffering on chick-
ens, without searching for a way to accomplish the goals of 
kindness to family and kindness to chickens—or, at least, not 
participating in their suffering—is simply not a kind or virtuous 
person.
Legal Applications
Taking into account the ease with which the meaning and ap-
plication of virtues can be manipulated, virtue ethics does not 
seem to provide a straightforward basis for a general anticru-
elty statute. Here I am distinguishing “general” from “specific” 
anticruelty statutes. General anticruelty statutes state in general 
terms that it is a criminal offense to mutilate, torment, torture, 
or kill an animal without necessity to inflict such serious suf-
fering or death. One can understand these laws as creating a 
duty not to harm other-than-human animals, with recognized 
exemptions and exceptions to the rule. Or, one can understand 
them as creating a balancing requirement captured by the re-
quirement that infliction of suffering be justified as “neces-
sary.” The language of general anticruelty statutes supports 
either understanding. 
Jurisdictions also have specific anticruelty statutes, such as a 
statute that prohibits cutting off the tails of dairy cows because 
of the suffering the cows endure when their tails are cut off 
(California Penal Code § 597n). Those are equally susceptible 
of being understood as requiring balancing as to each applica-
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tion of the law or as establishing duties for which exceptions 
are allowed. Nevertheless, it is in this context of more specif-
ic codification that virtue ethics may in some cases provide a 
procedural pathway to the enactment of virtue-oriented legal 
provisions. I will explore a specific example of that process 
shortly. At this point, however, I note only that it is unlikely that 
a general anticruelty statute written from an explicitly virtue 
ethical approach would look any different or be any different in 
operation than the current anticruelty statutes apparently pre-
mised on deontological or utilitarian grounds. For instance, an 
example of an apparently virtue-ethically-based law (but not a 
criminal anticruelty statute) is California’s Civil Code section 
1834, which requires “depositaries of living animals,” such as 
shelters and people who find apparently lost other-than-human 
animals, to treat those animals “kindly.” The virtue of kindness 
is explicitly invoked. However, there is no specified content of 
what it means to treat an other-than-human animal “kindly,” 
and, sadly, most animals held by animal shelters in California 
actually are not treated kindly despite the law requiring kind 
treatment. As in the case of this California Civil Code section, 
the level of statutory generality of general anticruelty statutes, 
too, provides too little guidance regardless of the moral philo-
sophical platform on which it was enacted. It does not antici-
pate or address how priority or application problems could be 
resolved. If we all shared an understanding of what such “kind-
ness” would entail in general terms, we would still have dif-
ficulty with application in specific contexts.
Another problem for codification of a virtue ethical standard 
is that codification freezes a process that must be dynamic until 
there is no remainder or apparent irresolvability. In fact, Hurst-
house explicitly cautions against the impulse to codify rules 
premised on outcomes resulting from the exercise of virtues 
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(Hursthouse 1999, 39-42, 56-59). Even if the unique intersec-
tion of circumstances and virtues could be captured in a rule, to 
be virtuous, one must seek to become ever more virtuous and 
not settle for the resolution of dilemmas that leave remainders 
and remorse. And codifying only one way of behaving when in 
fact there are several virtuous ways of behaving would not be 
virtuous, either. Codification would be appropriate only when 
apparent irresolvability has been resolved or accepted within 
the structure of the statute or when virtuous behavioral out-
comes consistently result in no remainder. We as a society are a 
long way from that as concerns other-than-human animals and 
general anticruelty statutes. 
If not in the context of general anticruelty laws, how could 
virtue ethical rules be used in the development of specific laws, 
which are, after all, written at some level of generality in or-
der to be codified? According to Hursthouse, being a virtuous 
person involves commitment to developing in oneself an en-
grained, virtuous approach to living in the world. The question 
one asks of oneself is “what kind of person do I want to be?” 
Moreover, the truly virtuous person enjoys living virtuously 
and does not begrudge “having” to be virtuous. To get to that 
point, a person has to exercise virtues repeatedly until they are 
second nature, without each time asking oneself whether one 
“must” act in accordance with particular virtues or if the dam-
age to one’s character will be too great if one doesn’t.Can law 
create the circumstances under which a person is required (or 
given enough choice) to behave virtuously in specific, particu-
larized circumstances? 
We think of laws as creating duties and rights, often but not 
always on a utilitarian basis. Is there room for the kind of ap-
proach Hursthouse envisions, an approach whose primary goal 
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is not the creation of duties and rights? Although it is difficult 
to imagine codification of an effective law that requires kind-
ness or compassion or integrity, there may be a few types of le-
gal proceedings in which virtue ethical principles supply some 
guidance. In the remainder of this essay, I return to my earlier 
example of feral cat colony management to explore the pos-
sibility of such an approach in the context of disputes about 
feral cat colony regulation. Such disputes are numerous in the 
United States (as well as in other countries), and various le-
gal approaches for dealing with feral cat colonies are emerging 
such that they can provide a means for considering possible 
virtue ethical-legal approaches. 
A Virtue Ethical Approach to Feral Cat Colony 
Regulation
 Because virtue ethical concepts can be understood and 
applied only in finer grained, particularized contexts, it is im-
portant to have some sense of who feral cats are. The quality 
of “feral-ness” pertains to the degree of contact and control a 
cat will readily accept from humans. Cats exhibit tempera-
ments that range from completely docile and trusting to totally 
human-avoidant. But that spectrum does not convey an accu-
rate picture. Many indoor cats behave at the docile end of the 
spectrum when they are with their human families but behave 
at the opposite end of the spectrum when they are around unfa-
miliar humans or in frightening or novel situations such as ani-
mal shelters or veterinary clinics. Some indoor cats who have 
received inadequate care or have been victimized by outright 
abuse may have behavioral triggers even though they are usu-
ally docile. 
Outdoor cats are equally difficult to categorize. Free-roam-
ing human-appreciating cats, who may spend chunks of time in-
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doors with human families, may look the same as free-roaming 
completely human-avoidant cats. Moreover, completely tame 
cats can “go feral,” and the offspring of completely feral cats 
can be tamed if they receive socialization by humans before 
they reach the age of 3 months. Thus, the categories of feral 
and non-feral cats are fairly fluid. Accordingly, beginning with 
an inquiry as to the moral status of feral cats prior to develop-
ing normative expectations of conduct towards feral cats would 
be difficult unless one retreated to classification based on their 
status as other-than-human animals.
That fluidity also confers more protection to cats than if 
the categories of feral and non-feral cats were distinct, with 
feral cats being treated as wild animals easily characterized 
as “pests,” such as raccoons and squirrels, for example. Am-
biguity or fluidity in categorizing cats results in a variety of 
protective responses to feral cats when there are proposals to 
use lethal methods to reduce outdoor cat populations. For in-
stance, some people think of all cats as similarly dependent on 
the kindness of people and deserving of protection; some worry 
only about the possibility of mistaking a pet cat for a feral cat; 
some actually respect feral cats for their fiercely independent 
characteristics. Thus, for various reasons, cats potentially sub-
ject to lethal population reduction have many vocal defenders 
when they are in danger.
Outdoor cats have vociferous detractors as well. When out-
door cat population sizes grow there are calls to trap and kill the 
cats who are blamed for predation on birds or use of flowerbeds 
as litter boxes, for example. Defenders argue that cats should 
not pay with their lives for someone’s heartless abandonment 
and that trap-neuter-return programs are more humane and 
more effective over time. Both sides appeal to local legislators 
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for codification of their approach, and legislators increasingly 
respond with some kind of legislative action, if only to dial 
down the volume of the controversy. 
Some jurisdictions opt for kill-oriented approaches. In 2002, 
ordinances in Akron, Ohio, allowed for the trapping and imme-
diate killing of “fractious” cats (City of Akron 2002). Although 
those statutes have been revised, the idea of killing or allowing 
the hunting of feral cats emerges with some frequency. Wiscon-
sin (Schabner 2005), New Jersey (Singer 2010), and Utah (Ad-
ams 2011) have all considered allowing hunting of feral cats.
Nevertheless, there are also municipalities that reject trap-
kill methods of population control if feral cat colony caretak-
ers agree to follow rules about colony management so as to 
minimize perceived nuisance or health risks. Colony caretakers 
and the heads of nonprofits dedicated to feral cat protection are 
sometimes called to help draft legislation that would allow feral 
cat colonies to exist as long as certain conditions are met. The 
cities of Glendale and Beverly Hills in California are two ex-
amples. Both cities enacted ordinances after participation in the 
process by feral cat colony caretakers and nonprofits dedicated 
to the protection of stray cats (City of Glendale 2004; City of 
Beverly Hills 2009). Yet the process of developing rules is ar-
duous and time-consuming because feral cat colony caretak-
ers have very different approaches to management and, having 
struggled with the moral and ethical dimensions of their deci-
sions, often feel that they have an ethical obligation to cats to 
press for codification of their way of doing things. 
It is in this context that a virtue ethical approach might be 
useful both in terms of how to ethically allow an outcome that 
does not wholly reflect one’s own sincere moral choices and as 
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to what type of ordinance would be a logical outcome of the 
process. The participants in this context share an interest in pro-
tecting feral cats and are uncertain only about the specifics of 
colony management to be codified in a regulatory scheme. The 
example that follows suggests that, as to situations in which im-
portant relevant facts are unknowable, legal rules should not be 
finally codified until those facts become knowable. This means 
that such rules should have built-in mechanisms for revisiting 
particular aspects of a rule, and there should be concerted ef-
fort on the part of participants to further educate themselves or, 
as Rosalind Hursthouse might recommend, pursue the practi-
cal wisdom necessary to revisit particular aspects in a virtuous 
way. 
Suppose, as has happened in several localities already, that 
a legislative body, such as a city council or county board of 
supervisors, calls on feral cat colony caretakers and the heads 
of organizations dedicated to the protection and defense of fe-
ral cats to participate in a series of meetings for the purpose of 
designing an appropriate set of conditions by which feral cat 
colonies could be maintained without causing a nuisance. Par-
ticipants are likely to agree without dispute that all cats must 
be spayed or neutered so as to prevent population growth.4 Not 
only is it through uncontrolled reproduction that cats become a 
nuisance to their human neighbors, spaying and neutering cats 
apparently confers health advantages to the individual cats.5 
This is not to say that there are no risks to individuals as a 
4 The description of feral cat caretakers’ approaches in this section is based 
on many interviews with feral cat caretakers in the greater Los Angeles area 
and my reading of the literature that pertains to feral cats and managed colo-
nies. 
5 Reported advantages to spayed females include less physiological stress 
associated with repeated pregnancies, births, and nursing in circumstances 
of limited access to food, with some data suggesting that there is a lower 
incidence of breast cancer in spayed cats. Neutered males reportedly roam 
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result of surgical intervention in their reproductive capacities 
or that interference with individuals’ reproductive capacities is 
morally unproblematic. However, there is currently no less in-
vasive or drastic a way of limiting feral cat population growth. 
There may be considerable disagreement about whether the 
spay requirement should also apply to pregnant females, since 
that would involve abortion, but discussion of spay-neuter re-
quirements usually begins on a platform of general agreement 
due to a recognition that it is the only currently feasible way 
of reducing the suffering attendant to uncontrolled population 
growth. By comparison, discussion of other possible require-
ments is not likely even to start from a position of agreement. 
I will work with just one example here because my goal is not 
to actually develop feral cat guidelines; my objective is to illus-
trate features of virtue ethical reasoning in a particular type of 
legal setting. In order to maintain focus on that objective rather 
than the specific content of the example, I have chosen an ex-
ample about which I would expect the reader not to have an im-
mediate reaction. It is the issue of whether to require the testing 
of feral cats for Feline Immunodeficiency Virus (FIV) and to 
require that the cat be killed if he or she tests positive. People 
who are generally ethical and who care very much about feral 
cats differ as to what to do about FIV infection and the ethical 
obligations of a feral cat caretaker as to FIV-infected members 
of their feral cat colonies.
FIV infection is similar to human HIV infection in that infec-
tion causes the individual to become more susceptible to other 
infections and illnesses. Individuals can lead long and healthy 
lives if they receive prompt veterinary care for illnesses, high 
quality food, and other incidents of a healthy lifestyle. Unfor-
tunately, not many feral cats have access to regular veterinary 
and fight less than unneutered males, which reduces their risks of contracting 
certain illnesses, abscesses, and other infections. 
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care, and most live outdoors in less than ideal circumstances for 
the prevention of secondary effects from FIV infection. More-
over, there are individual FIV-infected cats who, like some hu-
man individuals with HIV infection, suffer such severe wast-
ing and vulnerability to illness that their deaths can be fairly 
attributed to the infection itself. Those individuals may suffer 
considerably before their deaths.
FIV is transmitted between cats during mating or by way of 
deep bites through which the virus carried by one cat’s saliva 
can enter the blood stream of the other cat. It can also be trans-
mitted from mothers to their unborn kittens. It is not transmit-
ted when one cat eats or drinks from the same bowl as an FIV-
infected cat. Although the question is very difficult to study 
scientifically, the percentage of feral cats with FIV is thought to 
be very low.6  However, there can be colonies with high rates of 
FIV infection, and FIV could spread through a colony if an in-
fected individual fights frequently with other cats in the colony. 
There is currently no cure for FIV infection, despite the re-
ported development of some drugs useful in treating the con-
dition.7 Also, there are very few sanctuary options for FIV-in-
fected cats. Also relevant is the fact that cats who have been 
6 It is actually difficult to get a good assessment of FIV prevalence because 
it is difficult to study feral cat populations. Moreover, people who do study 
feral cat populations are usually not neutral; they are usually invested some-
how in promoting either the killing or preservation of feral cats. However, a 
localized study conducted in 2010 in western Canada produced the following 
results: among 1,205 cats, 5.5% tested positive for FIV infection. (Ravi et al. 
2010, 271).
7 T-Cyte Therapeutics claims to have developed a USDA-approved drug for 
the treatment of FIV infection (http://tcyte.com/?gclid=CNnwpctC3rMCFS
FyQgodnwkA3Q). However, it is not billed as cure. Also, it is not currently 
practical to inject feral cats with any type of medicine except when the cat is 
already sedated (as for spay/neuter), and, therefore, it would not be possible 
to follow a treatment protocol involving more than one injection.
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vaccinated against FIV will sometimes test positive for the 
antibodies in a subsequent FIV test. Since some feral cats are 
abandoned cats who have “gone feral,” there is the possibility 
that a cat will test positive only because of previous vaccina-
tion. 
Feral cat colony caretakers sort and weigh all of this infor-
mation differently. A colony caretaker might decide to kill an 
FIV-positive cat who is not yet suffering actively from FIV 
rather than return her to the colony. Her conscientious and com-
passionate assessment of the benefits and risks from the cat’s 
and other cats’ perspectives may well be based on actual ex-
perience dealing with cats whose FIV infection has developed 
in such a way that the cats appeared to have suffered horribly 
before and as they died. Having been trapped once, many cats 
will not go near a trap again, and a colony caretaker may be 
helpless to relieve such a cat’s final suffering. Indeed, some 
cats disappear when they become debilitated, presumably hav-
ing found a protected place to die. The caretaker might also 
be calculating risk of other cats’ exposure, with the knowledge 
that veterinarians cannot tell her which FIV-positive cats are 
likely to develop a full-blown, debilitating case. Taking all of 
these factors together and making a decision based on compas-
sion for the individual cat, concern for other members of the 
community, and respect for life, the colony caretaker who kills 
can be said to have virtuously resolved the dilemma of what 
to do about an FIV-positive feral cat in her colony as current 
information and options now stand.
Another equally virtuous feral cat colony caretaker might 
understand the same virtues—compassion, regard for others, 
and respect for life—as requiring her to return the cat to the 
colony. She may consider the risks of FIV progression and 
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transmission too low and life too precious for her to take the 
cat’s life. Such a person is actually better off not testing at all, 
and, in fact, her understanding of her ethical obligations to the 
cat and the colony might cause her justifiably and virtuously to 
resist a legal requirement that feral cat colony caretakers FIV 
test all cats trapped for spay/neuter. After all, getting a defini-
tive FIV test can be expensive and saps funds caretakers could 
spend on cat food and spay/neuter surgeries. 
It would appear that this is what Rosalind Hursthouse would 
identify as an irresolvable dilemma. At this state of scientific 
knowledge about the illness and without alternatives such as 
FIV cat sanctuaries, equally virtuous feral cat caretakers could 
reach equally virtuous but completely different conclusions 
about moral conduct in the case of a feral cat who tests positive 
for FIV. Yet this is a situation in which only one way of handling 
the situation would be embedded in the ordinance; either there 
would be a requirement of testing and killing or there would not 
be, with the outcome under the latter circumstance that some 
feral cat colony caretakers would not be testing at all or would 
be knowingly returning an FIV-positive cat to their colonies.8 
As unethical as that seems to the caretaker who would test and 
kill if the FIV test result is positive, it makes sense to leave the 
8 Feline leukemia spreads more easily than FIV infection because it can be 
transmitted by shared water and food bowls. Feline leukemia also more cer-
tainly results in death directly attributable to leukemia. For those reasons, 
some caretakers test for leukemia and will kill in the context of a positive test 
result, if they have no hospice options. Currently, many veterinarians offer a 
combination feline leukemia and FIV test. If the FIV test comes back posi-
tive, a more definitive but expensive test can be run. There are caretakers who 
will not kill in the presence of a negative leukemia test result even if there is 
a positive FIV result, and they will not request the more expensive definitive 
FIV test because they would not kill strictly for the reason of FIV-positive 
test results in any case. These circumstances can result in some apparently 
FIV-positive cats being returned to colonies. 
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law open on this point and not to require one course of action or 
another. That is because the reason for the irresolvability of the 
dilemma has to do with factually quite volatile factors. Infor-
mation about FIV infection, the development of FIV positive 
cat sanctuaries, and possible cures for FIV infection could all 
emerge after the initial legal regime has been put in place. Simi-
larly virtuous feral cat caretakers could take similarly morally 
defensible but completely different actions with dramatically 
different effects on cats. 
Suppose that the legal regime is put in place without specifi-
cation of obligations as to FIV testing. After that regime is en-
acted, veterinary medical science determines that FIV infection 
can be managed or its transmission prevented in ways that are 
financially affordable and easy to accomplish even as to feral 
cats whom caretakers cannot touch at all. The first caretaker—
the caretaker who tests and kills if a cat tests positive for FIV—
should be willing to adjust her policies accordingly, and the 
existing law not requiring testing/killing would facilitate that 
adjustment. A virtuous person might delay making the change 
until she is convinced by more studies than it would take to 
convince another caretaker, but ultimately a virtuous caretaker 
will remain open to new reliable information that is relevant to 
her ways of doing things. Indeed, a virtuous caretaker would 
seek out such information in order always to be making de-
cisions with as much information as possible. The one thing 
she cannot do as a virtuous caretaker is decide as a permanent 
matter how she is going to handle a life and death matter for a 
cat and thus fail to continually look for relevant information, 
be it veterinary medical information or information about FIV-
positive cat sanctuaries. Being virtuous must include remaining 
flexible enough to reshape one’s decisions.
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Similarly, the second caretaker—the caretaker who doesn’t 
test at all or who doesn’t test and kill—must remain open to 
the possibility that new information could result in a different 
calculation of risk and ethical obligations flowing from that 
risk. It might take a lot of change in relevant data before such 
a caretaker would shift from life-preserving to life-taking be-
cause, after all, taking another’s life is serious moral business, 
even if a feral cat could tell us that she would choose death 
under the circumstance of a positive FIV test result. What the 
caretaker cannot do and remain virtuous in her management of 
the colony is blind herself to new relevant information or fail 
to seek out relevant information. To use Rosalind Hursthouse’s 
terminology, virtuous caretakers should resist embedding spe-
cific legal provisions, even if those provisions would comport 
with their genuine beliefs about virtuous conduct, as long as 
a resolvable dilemma has not yet been resolved or as long as 
an irresolvable dilemma is irresolvable (there is more than one 
equally virtuous approach). Those aspects of the law should 
remain open until enough information becomes available to 
have some measure of comfort that the dilemma is resolved or 
resolvable. Of course, it is not always easy to identify which di-
lemmas fall into these categories and, therefore, require leaving 
those matters open for the time being. Because of commitments 
to their own virtuous resolutions of dilemmas, caretakers could 
fail to see a dilemma as irresolvable or as not yet resolved from 
another virtuous person’s point of view. Lack of confidence that 
others are equally virtuous can make one skeptical that others 
who have resolved the dilemma differently have resolved the 
dilemma in a virtuous way. 
In the example I have considered, the feral cat caretakers 
would most likely agree that requiring spay/neuter would be 
important in any regulation for the establishment or legal rec-
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ognition of a feral cat colony, even though there are some moral 
and ethical issues associated with forever altering the repro-
ductive capacity of an animal and with spaying pregnant cats. 
The dilemma of whether to spay/neuter feral cats is resolvable, 
albeit with the “remainder” of regret for some adverse conse-
quences of the resolution. It is possible to argue that utilitarian-
ism plays an important role in virtuously responding to a par-
ticular dilemma, but Rosalind Hursthouse does not contend that 
hybrid utilitarian-virtue ethical or hybrid deontological-virtue 
ethical outcomes are inferior to virtue ethical applications. She 
contends only that virtue ethics, too, has a valid and valuable 
role to play in providing guidance in the resolution of questions 
about how we ought to behave in particular situations. 
As the example of FIV testing illustrates, several other as-
pects of feral cat colony management might well be left open 
either with the possibility of revisiting the ordinance as part of 
a sunset provision or as part of an explicit procedural mecha-
nism by which future amendments are considered. If a law is 
scheduled to “sunset” (expire) on a particular date, there will 
be a date certain at which the law will be reviewed in light 
of currently available information and alternatives. Although 
it might be more difficult or expensive than a sunset provision, 
it would be more helpful if the law instead contained a mecha-
nism for regularly updating associated regulations or rules as, 
for instance, the establishment of a committee charged with 
regular review of information and perspectives relevant to feral 
cat colony maintenance. Through either mechanism, over time, 
apparent gaps in substantive laws would be filled as once ir-
resolvable dilemmas are resolved or as true irresolvability is 
recognized and the law is left open enough for different virtu-
ous avenues to be taken.
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It is important to clarify that “leaving a law open” on a par-
ticular point, such as not requiring FIV testing in a feral cat 
colony management ordinance, is not the same thing as creat-
ing an “ambiguous” law. A law that does not speak to a particu-
lar activity, such as FIV testing, may be quite clear and non-
ambiguous as to requirements actually established by the law. 
Indeed, all laws need to be sufficiently clear that those affected 
by them can know what compliance entails. “Ambiguity” or 
“vagueness” as a standard argument to undermine, invalidate, 
or repeal laws in all sorts of different legal contexts is not ab-
sent in the animal law context. State anticruelty statutes have 
been challenged as unconstitutionally vague as to which other-
than-human animals are covered and which acts, prohibited. 
More recently, an unsuccessful lawsuit filed by an egg farmer 
in California claimed that a law ending intensive confinement 
caging systems in egg production in California and codified in 
California’s Health and Safety Code sections 25990-25994 is 
unconstitutionally vague because it does not include sufficient 
guidance for farmers to enable them to avoid criminal punish-
ment and fines (Cramer v. Brown 2012). Not including a re-
quirement, such as not requiring FIV testing, does not subject a 
colony caretaker to risk of punishment for violating an ambigu-
ous law. 
Conclusion
Bringing people together to participate in decisions, be they 
about refinement of substantive rules or dispute resolution 
about particular conflicts, does not ensure that those people 
will behave virtuously. People who have been taught that they 
are virtuous if they follow rules, even without understanding 
the foundation of those rules in virtue, or if they successfully 
exploit loopholes in laws, may not readily adopt a different 
conception of virtue that requires ongoing practice in the de-
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velopment of practical wisdom in applying virtues within the 
structure of a law left open for that purpose as to some aspects. 
It does not appear that we have a culture of virtue in that sense 
or, if there is a culture of virtue, that the virtues most highly 
prized are ones that lead to compassionate outcomes for oth-
er-than-human animals. Indeed, humans arguably display the 
most creativity and ingenuity when justifying decisions that are 
not virtuous and in blinding themselves to their flaws. More-
over, it does not seem that legal process is a good place to instill 
an approach to living that may be best embedded through other 
avenues in our society. For that reason, legal rules premised 
directly on virtues, such as “owners of living animals shall treat 
them kindly,” have little utility in the American legal system. 
The level of generality at which they are enacted provides in-
sufficient guidance to those who would be potentially liable. 
 It seems that a virtue ethical approach in animal law is most 
likely to be productive, if at all, in situations like the example of 
substantive rule refinement by participants who share sufficient 
values and interests to proceed in good faith. People whose 
moral commitments vary greatly from one another would have 
difficulty cooperating productively in the creation of legal rules 
premised primarily on the operation of virtue ethical theory. 
However, it does seem that a virtue ethical approach could be 
possible in the development of substantive legal rules through 
processes that require relatively virtuous participation by those 
who understand virtues and virtuous conduct in similar ways 
in the specific contexts at issue. As the feral cat example illus-
trates, participants in the process may start with strong moral 
attachment to particular regulatory requirements. But, if it can 
be shown that there is some informational uncertainty associ-
ated with their position and that there are morally justifiable 
reasons to leave an apparent gap in the law, they should be 
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willing to leave substantive rules open to future development 
as new information comes available, thereby facilitating more 
rapid resolution of issues to put in place laws that are at least 
somewhat kinder than existing laws. Through the inclusion of 
sunset provisions or automatic review provisions, more provi-
sions can be adopted and existing provisions can be revised 
when more information is available to resolve dilemmas once 
understood as irresolvable.
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